To: Ed Zuercher  
   City Manager  

From: Jeri L. Williams  
      Police Chief  

Date: January 29, 2018  

Subject: PRESIDENTIAL VISIT AFTER ACTION REPORT

On August 22, 2017, a presidential visit to Phoenix put our community on the worldwide stage. While the City of Phoenix is experienced and well respected in hosting large scale events of this nature, this particular event brought with it dynamics that created an environment that would eventually challenge our city, our residents and our police department.

For perspective, hosting a Super Bowl takes 18-months of planning and preparation. The scheduling of this event required a similar level of planning and security but with only six days' notice. In addition, the itinerary kept evolving and with just a couple days' notice, we learned that this presidential visit would be unique as it also included the U.S. vice president, the president's chief of staff and the U.S. secretary of housing and urban development. It was a rare scheduling of so many dignitaries for one event, which required extra layers of logistics with local, state and federal partners.

In the weeks' prior, cities throughout the country were experiencing free speech rallies with tragic consequences. Boston and Berkeley had increasing levels of violence and destruction. We know the Charlottesville rally ended in a death. National media stories on the issues in other cities put a heightened spotlight on Phoenix as hundreds of local and national media were assigned to cover the rally in our city.

For the Phoenix event, we had enough pre-information to expect multiple, diverse groups of the public with differing, and in many cases, conflicting views. The list of groups planning to attend the event, in both protest and support, grew by the hour indicating we should expect thousands of people. It is important to recognize that the vast majority of participants were peaceful, organized and respectful. Free speech and expression were celebrated. Community groups did extensive planning to be prepared for the hot weather where temperatures reached more than 100 degrees.

Good policing, especially in high-profile situations, requires information, communication and objective leadership to serve all members of the community. It is a graceful balance to maintain peace where there is discord. As your Police Chief, I am dedicated to doing everything possible to preserve life, prevent injury and protect property – for everyone.

As we developed and implemented our Operations Plan, our goal was to provide for a safe event with preservation of life and property at the top of our list. My instructions to our officers
were clear: be professional, decisive, and immediately responsive. We would not allow criminal conduct to endanger our residents and visitors.

As with any critical incident, it is our responsibility to objectively review our actions to determine what is working and what needs improvement. Supervisors from the Professional Standards Bureau worked tirelessly to review our Operations Plan and official actions taken during the event to determine if our actions were just and necessary. As expected, some areas for improvement were identified and we are making adjustments to our response model to better serve our community. My high-level summary of the After Action Report includes:

What Went Well

**Before:** The use of an Incident Management Team to staff our planning and preparations was well orchestrated. This model, used during large scale events, allows us to combine resources from a variety of partners including law enforcement agencies, fire departments, and other city, county, state and federal services. Over 100 public and private partners contributed to this event with thousands of dedicated sworn and non-sworn individuals providing support.

**During:** The Police Department maintained operational consistency. Regular police services continued throughout the City while nearly 1,000 public safety professionals staffed this event. The President, the Vice President, and the other high level dignitaries remained safe throughout their visit. Officers working the event operated as a singular component under the direction of the Incident Commander.

**After:** There was no loss of life related to this event. There were minimal reports of injury related to this event. There was no significant property damage related to this event.

Areas for Improvement

**Before:** We must increase our use of communication platforms to educate and inform the community on acceptable and unacceptable conduct with repetitive messages carried out as often as possible before an event. Expand our use of social media and improve real time communications with leaders of community groups to ensure current information is available and shared with those in attendance at large scale events.

**During:** Increase the use of on-site communications with real time observations and information through social media and amplified technologies as often as possible during an event. Increase the number and use of bullhorns / megaphones and related means to direct the crowd when necessary. Include messaging that relays the need for immediate dispersal and directions to do so safely and in a manner that can reach as many people as possible.

**After:** Improve reporting of tools that were used during the operation, particularly those used only during critical crowd control efforts, such as smoke, gas and impact projectiles. During post event media coverage, I should make clear to the public that information is still
unfolding. To promote transparency and full investigation, the public should be directed where and how to report injuries, property damage or related concerns.

**Conclusion:**

Every major event is unique. The August 22 presidential visit to Phoenix included extraordinary circumstances with recent profound national events; a larger than normal dignitary presence; thousands of residents and visitors standing outside in high temperatures; and multiple diverse members of the public in attendance. We communicated to the community before the event and we listened and received both positive and negative feedback afterwards.

Some of the criticism about the Police Department’s response was focused on differences in communication, particularly providing clear, audible and consistent directions to the crowd. Some of that criticism came from people who were attempting to peacefully express their views. And at the same time, our officers received praise for their professionalism and collaboration in managing a clearly tense situation.

I take responsibility with respect to listening to both sides, clearly self-examining our work, and leading the department. I still believe the actions of our officers reflected the direction I gave them: be professional, decisive and immediately reactive. The tragedies that happened in other cities did not happen in Phoenix.

Having said that, we must take the input of our community members seriously and I strive to live up to our community’s trust. As we reviewed the operation, we worked to identify areas of improvement to better serve our community during future events. We will build upon what worked well and adjust those areas that need improvement. We will continue to reinforce dialogue and trust between all members of the community and our police officers who proudly serve this City.
Background

On August 22, 2017, the President of the United States and other federal dignitaries arrived in Arizona and departed on August 23, 2017. During the visit, the President attended and spoke at a rally at the Phoenix Convention Center. This event brought thousands of community members and groups with conflicting views to the downtown Phoenix area. Phoenix Police and Fire Departments along with several other federal, state, county, and local law enforcement agencies coordinated all public safety activities associated with this event. There were numerous meetings scheduled to establish each agency’s role regarding overall goals and timelines. The Phoenix Police and Fire Departments had a significant role in planning and providing support for this event, and initiated the National Incident Management System (NIMS) model to coordinate the efforts of the involved agencies.

The NIMS model is a systematic, proactive approach to guide departments and agencies at all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to work together seamlessly and manage incidents involving all threats and hazards—regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity—in order to reduce loss of life, property, and harm to the environment.

The purpose of the NIMS is to provide a common approach for managing incidents. The concepts provide for a flexible but standardized set of incident management practices with emphasis on common principles, a consistent approach to operational structures and supporting mechanisms, and an integrated approach to resource management.

There are instances where success depends on the involvement of multiple jurisdictions, levels of government, functional agencies, and/or emergency-responder disciplines. These instances necessitate effective and efficient coordination across this broad spectrum of organizations and activities. NIMS provides a comprehensive national approach that improves the effectiveness of emergency management and response personnel across the full spectrum of potential threats and hazards (including natural hazards, terrorist activities, and other human-caused disasters) regardless of size or complexity.

Under this model, the Phoenix Police and Fire Departments provided significant sworn and non-sworn public safety personnel to staff the City of Phoenix Incident Management Team (IMT). The IMT, a part of the overall Emergency Operations Center (EOC), initiated unified planning five days prior to the President’s visit after confirming the event at the Phoenix Convention Center was under contract.

The Phoenix Police Professional Standards Bureau Inspections Unit was tasked with tracking Phoenix Public Safety activities and compiling information obtained to complete an After-Action Report. The assigned Phoenix public safety personnel that primarily staffed this event and contributed information to this After-Action Report are:

- Homeland Defense Bureau (HDB) - IMT
- Tactical Response Unit (TRU)
- Community Relations Bureau (CRB)
- Public Affairs Bureau (PAB)
- Professional Standards Bureau (PSB)
- Employee Assistance Unit (EAU)
- Fire Department
At the conclusion of the event, IMT section leaders and staff from the aforementioned bureaus or units, were tasked with developing and providing an After-Action Summary report to the Professional Standards Bureau Inspections Unit documenting the following related to the event:

- Assigned duties and functions
- Summary of activities
- Opportunities for improvement
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**Phoenix Police Incident Report # 2017-001478672 Attached**
After-Action Summary Reports

Homeland Defense Bureau / Incident Management Team (IMT)

Assigned Duties & Functions

Incident Commanders

The Incident Management Team (IMT) personnel initiated unified planning five days prior to the President’s visit, which was immediately implemented upon being advised the event space in the Convention Center was under contract. Incident Commanders are responsible for the overall planning and utilization of resources regarding operations for Phoenix public safety personnel. In addition, they direct coordination efforts with regional partners to ensure the successful completion of assigned operations.

The IMT is managed by two Incident Commanders, one from both the police and fire departments. The primary sections of the IMT are:

- Planning
- Operations
- Intelligence
- Logistics
- Finance

Planning Section

The Planning Section is responsible for organizing the event and documenting the manpower and work assignments of all assigned personnel. Planning also organizes and manages all meetings and provides situation updates throughout the event as directed by the Incident Commander.

Operations Section

The Operations Section is responsible for the overall coordination of public safety assets and keeping the Incident Commander updated on the operation and situational awareness activities for informed decision making. Operations was responsible for two significant branches which included the majority of the police and fire personnel assigned to this event. The first was the Dignitary Protection Branch, which included airport and motorcade operations. The second was the Public Safety Branch, which consisted of personnel assigned to the Convention Center, Tactical Response Unit (TRU), Air Support, Margaret T. Hance Park, Transit, Hazmat, and Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) Groups.

Intelligence Section

The Intelligence Section is responsible for preventing, detecting, and mitigating potential unlawful activity through the collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of information to appropriate law enforcement personnel.
Logistics Section

The Logistics Section is responsible for establishing the IMT facility and providing appropriate resources, to include communications and technical equipment, ground support, and any needed supplies.

Finance Section

The Finance Section is responsible for financial tracking of all Phoenix public safety expenditures relating to the Presidential visit. In addition, the section comprised of Police Professional Standards Bureau Inspections and Fire Budget personnel was tasked with developing a City of Phoenix Public Safety After-Action Report.

Summary of Activities

Prior to the event, Planning personnel coordinated multiple group meetings with Phoenix Command Team members, Secret Service staff, and a strategic partner meeting with non-public safety entities. During the event, there were multiple situational updates provided to the public safety executive staff, city management staff, and elected officials.

Operations personnel managed four separate motorcades and ensured proper response and handling of suspicious packages and persons. EOD conducted canine sweeps along routes and primary locations prior to arrival and departure of Air Force One. In addition, Operations coordinated the Tactical Response Unit activities regarding the mitigation of conflicts (see the TRU section). The Dignitary Protection Branch of Operations managed the President, Vice President, President’s Chief of Staff, along with the Secretary of US Housing and Urban Development movements and security during the visit. This was done in partnership with federal and local law enforcement agencies.

Prior to and during the event, Intelligence personnel monitored information being posted on open source platforms from community groups stating the desire to support or disrupt event activities. This information was provided to Incident Commanders and IMT personnel so appropriate operational procedures could be implemented.

Finance personnel collected staffing rosters and entered hours worked into an electronic financial tracking system. There were 882 police and 103 fire employees utilized during the event. Straight time costs could not be accurately determined since several additional employees were utilized in on-duty and overtime capacities as demonstration activities escalated into the evening hours on the day of the event. Overtime costs for police ($477,226) and fire ($83,157) totaled $560,383. In addition, equipment and barricade combined costs were $12,177.

Additional information gathered at the IMT:

- A total of 985 Phoenix public safety employees were utilized for this event
- Approximately 11,000 people were able to attend the event inside the Phoenix Convention Center
- Approximately 4,500 people were still in line to enter the Phoenix Convention Center when the doors were closed to the event
- Approximately 6,000 people gathered outside the Convention Center with groups showing up as early as 10:00 AM
• There were no arrests made inside the Phoenix Convention Center
• There was one person removed from the Convention Center during the event
• All dignitary movements were completed without issue
• Individuals deployed chemical agents toward police during and after the event
• At approximately 8:33 PM, police deployed chemical agents and crowd control tactics in response to unlawful activities (see the timeline in the TRU section).
  o From approximately 8:33 PM – 10:45 PM, there were 7 calls dispatched to the Fire Department for the following:
    ▪ Three officers were treated related to extreme heat conditions
    ▪ One officer was treated for difficulty breathing
    ▪ One person was treated for illness
    ▪ Five to six news reporters were treated for “tear gas” exposure, none were transported
    ▪ One person treated for a laceration to the face, police and fire responded, not transported
• There were eight Incident Reports documenting five arrests, see the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IR #</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Arrest</th>
</tr>
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<td>2017-001475165</td>
<td>Criminal Damage</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>2017-001475176</td>
<td>Disorderly Conduct – Refuse to Disperse</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>2017-001475182</td>
<td>Aggravated Assault on Police</td>
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<td>2017-001484734</td>
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<td>No Subject Identified</td>
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<tr>
<td>2017-001491560</td>
<td>Unlawful Assembly</td>
<td>No Subject Identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017-001516522</td>
<td>Aggravated Assault on Police</td>
<td>No Subject Identified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tactical Response Unit (TRU)

Assigned Duties & Functions

The Tactical Response Unit (TRU) was assigned under the Operations Section of the Phoenix Public Safety Incident Management Team (IMT). An action plan was developed through collaboration with the United States Secret Service, Phoenix public safety agencies, Phoenix Convention Center staff, and City leadership. The goal was to manage public safety, mitigate incidents that could result in property damage, and protect the rights of those attending the event at the Phoenix Convention Center, along with those gathered in the downtown Phoenix area. The action plan documented:

- The establishment of the police command post in the downtown Phoenix area
- Rehabilitation location staffed with fire personnel at the Convention Center
- Briefing locations and times for deployment of personnel
- Assigned radio channels for the staff assigned to the event
- Dedicated air support resources
- Assignment of police supervisors and officers
- Mutual aid law enforcement agencies and resources
- Arrest procedures
- Unlawful assembly statement and warning

Summary of Activities

Note: Police efforts to deescalate or significant turning points are documented in bold print

On the day of the event, TRU implemented the action plan which included:

- Traffic closures and vehicle incursion hardening security procedures
- Monitoring attendees and lines at the Convention Center and the overflow area
- Operations zone and a large overflow area containing:
  - Pedestrian fencing lined with messaging tape stating “Do Not Cross”
    - This encompassed Monroe Street from 2nd to 5th Streets
  - Fixed and mobile officer positions

The operations zone was critical in maintaining public safety as it provided a staging area for fire, paramedic, and police mobile field force resources. A field force is comprised of police officers and supervisors specifically trained and equipped to manage demonstration activities. In addition, the operations zone facilitated the rapid response to emergencies, which enhanced security for the President, federal officials, and citizens.

TRU anticipated and prepared for large crowds from both attendees of the event and community groups. The groups began to arrive in downtown as early as 3:00 AM during the closure set up and the number of individuals increased rapidly throughout the day. By 11:00 AM, large crowds were lining up on 2nd Street between Van Buren and Washington Streets. Police motor units were deployed to control both vehicular and pedestrian traffic in the area. By 2:00 PM, the size of the crowd dictated a full closure of 2nd Street from Van Buren to Washington Streets, including the side streets of Adams and Monroe. Police Field Force squads that were in staging locations were deployed for crowd control to keep groups separated. These deployments increased throughout
the day as the crowds continued to increase. **The Field Force squads were primarily used to keep access points open, intersections cleared, and opposing groups separated to prevent violence while still allowing free movement and the ability to exercise the right to free speech.** The deployment of the police personnel to fixed positions was critical, as thousands of people arrived in the downtown area after marching in large groups from various locations throughout the city. As the crowds increased and continued to move within downtown, a large area was designated as an overflow to avoid overcrowding, group conflicts and to enhance public safety.

At approximately 5:30 PM, TRU initiated messaging directed at individuals in line at the time when the United States Secret Service (USSS) closed the doors and no longer allowed access to the event at the Convention Center. The line was extensive and without messaging, the crowd of several thousand exiting into downtown without proper information and direction could have been problematic. It was decided to maintain separation of opposing groups. An exit strategy was implemented to move the large group south and west or east from the Convention Center and away from the conflicting community groups in the overflow area. In conjunction with Community Response Squads (CRS), **TRU personnel effectively handled several minor altercations and worked diligently to prevent additional physical confrontations by utilizing strategic exit patterns.**

At approximately 7:00 PM, TRU officers observed water bottles being thrown at event attendees from the overflow area southbound across Monroe Street. TRU officers who were also in danger of being struck, were deployed along the south side of Monroe Street along the exit route to position themselves between the two opposing groups. Officers were deployed from the south side to the middle of Monroe, between 1st and 5th Streets to discourage any further projectiles from being thrown. The Air Unit (police helicopter) also responded as a deterrent. Plainclothes CRS Officers were utilized throughout the event to contact and warn the groups, in an effort to cease illegal activity.

At approximately 7:20 PM, the LRAD (Long Range Acoustic Device), a high-volume communication system designed to give clear instructions to large crowds in amplified noise conditions was utilized. Instructions encouraged community members and groups to demonstrate peacefully, not to cross the fence and police lines, and not to throw objects. Two TRU officers issued these warnings on Monroe Street between 1st and 5th Streets.

At approximately 8:15 PM, TRU officers report water bottles being thrown down at them from the 2nd and Monroe Street parking garage. There were officers already in the garage dealing with another issue one level below from where subjects were throwing water bottles. Additional officers were dispatched to the garage and the entire structure was secured to prevent any further incidents.

Throughout the afternoon and evening, CRS Officers maintained communication with community groups and organizers, providing uniformed TRU personnel with regular intelligence updates. CRS attempted to contact and communicate with individuals that identified themselves as ANTIFA (for readability and clarification purposes, this group will be referred to as ANTIFA throughout the remainder of this report). Information reviewed by Phoenix Police Department Intelligence personnel found ANTIFA tends to be anti-government and have engaged in protest activities that include property damage and physical violence. ANTIFA has been associated with property damage and violence at demonstrations in Berkeley California and Charlottesville Virginia earlier this year. Based on this intelligence regarding ANTIFA, their past practices has demonstrated a
propensity for violence across the country. **As ANTIFA members were contacted throughout the night, they were given warnings to demonstrate peacefully.** The group would not respond to police communications. By approximately 8:20 PM, a group of 15 to 20 ANTIFA representatives became situated near the south end of the overflow area, against the pedestrian fencing. Once there, they raised two large signs and began to conceal themselves behind the signs. Although hidden from the officers on Monroe Street, it was apparent that their movements were suspicious and required further investigation. TRU requested the Air Unit fly over and provide intelligence on ANTIFA activities. By 8:30 PM, the ANTIFA group began gathering behind the large signs and it appeared bags were being opened and items were being distributed. At this time, the type of items being distributed could not be determined.

TRU personnel, which included three grenadiers (specialty trained officers on deployment of chemical munitions), were positioned in the area where ANTIFA was gathering. TRU supervisors advised that if the ANTIFA group, or any others, tried to breach the fencing, the deployment of pepper ball rounds into the ground in front of them was authorized to stop that activity. It was essential to maintain the secure operations along Monroe Street for several reasons:

- Monroe Street was a critical public safety thoroughway, as it was the only way for emergency services to access the north, northwest, and northeast side of the Convention Center
- The overflow area was filled with community members and groups clustered up against the north Monroe Street pedestrian fencing. Due to the volume of individuals along the fence line, the integrity of the fence had to be maintained to avoid interaction and possible confrontation with other crowd members
- At that moment, (8:33 PM) the President, and other federal officials were departing the venue, requiring police to secure the area and maintain separation between the Convention Center, 5th Street, and the crowd in the overflow area
- During this time, attendees were exiting the event at 2nd and Adams Streets. A significant number of individuals from the event began walking north bound on 2nd Street toward Monroe Street. Had an incursion along Monroe Street occurred, there would be little to no buffer between the opposing groups
- Monroe Street borders the north section of the Convention Center. A loss of separation between opposing groups and the building could have led to incidents of property damage

At approximately 8:32 PM, the ANTIFA group began pushing the fence and attempted to use the wood supports attached to the signs as levers in an effort to topple the pedestrian fencing. Pepper ball munitions were strategically deployed into the ground in front of ANTIFA. The munitions operated as expected and moved the group of approximately 15 to 20 away from the fence which created distance between ANTIFA and police to avoid any potential physical confrontation. After the initial incursion and TRU response, the fence integrity was maintained. No further action was required as the offenders moved north away from the fence line. **The ANTIFA group began to circulate into the surrounding crowd and the frequency of items being thrown at officers rapidly increased. Items thrown were rocks, frozen water bottles, and regular filled water bottles. Officers without shields dodged the objects as they continued to maintain assigned positions and observe the crowd.**

At approximately 8:34 PM, an unknown object was thrown from the crowd directly at the TRU line. It was quickly identified as a small gas grenade, and as it hit the ground an unknown gas began exhausting from it. TRU personnel along Monroe Street were directed to don gas masks by the Field Force Commander. As the gas spread, it was identified by
the grenadiers as possibly CS gas, commonly known as “Tear Gas.” Several officers were affected and treated through an on-site decontamination process.

TRU Officers then deployed smoke grenades to the area along Monroe Street where the ANTIFA group attempted to breach the fence. The wind direction was directly north by northwest and was taken into account during the deployment to disperse the smoke strategically toward the ANTIFA group. At this time, there were no active tear gas agents deployed. Smoke was utilized as a visual attempt to stop illegal activities and encourage the group to leave without deploying active chemical agents into the crowd. However, the individuals believed to be tied to the ANTIFA group reached over and through the fence and began kicking and throwing police deployed smoke munitions from Monroe Street back at the TRU Officers. Several ANTIFA group members donned gas masks and/or other face coverings indicating a preplanned effort to disrupt the event. As TRU munitions deployed, some were tossed back toward officers. The intent was for the smoke to defuse the situation, create distance, and to avoid escalating tactics. However, the frequency of items being thrown at officers significantly increased.

At approximately 8:36 PM, another type of pyrotechnical munition was thrown directly at TRU Officers. In response, grenadiers were ordered to deploy CS gas canisters in the same focused location; in the street along the north gutter. Once again, ANTIFA group members began throwing and kicking the canisters toward the TRU Officers. The grenadiers had permission to engage anyone attempting to assault officers by throwing or kicking gas canisters toward them. Pepper ball, 40mm foam impact rounds and sting balls (less lethal munitions used to dispense CS powder and cayenne pepper), were authorized for deployment by TRU supervisors if needed.

After the initial deployment of the CS Canisters, TRU Officers paused to assess if the agent had the desired effect to disperse unlawful individuals from the area. As a result of the deployment of CS Gas, several individuals from the targeted area vacated, however a core group of aggressive individuals remained and continued to throw projectiles at officers. At this time, it was decided to deploy TRU personnel north through the fence line to the targeted area, past the deployed munitions, to prevent any further misuse, and extend a police line from Monroe Street to the north against the south side of the Herberger Theater. This movement was conducted in an effort to stop the deployment of TRU munitions back toward officers and prevent property damage to the Convention Center. The movement was also designed to set up a formation which would allow TRU to make additional announcements and place officers in a position to prevent property damage to the Catholic Diocese on 3rd Street and the Herberger Theater. At 8:34 PM, the Air Unit was requested to illuminate the area, provide intelligence, and to provide an amplified notification as the LRAD was no longer effective due to the gas and munitions present in the air and personnel donning gas masks. During TRU’s initial movement past the north fencing and toward the Herberger Theater, aggressive individuals continued to assault officers by throwing objects, while the grenadiers continued to support operations by deploying chemical munitions.

At 8:52 PM, two police lines were formed, one facing east and one west. The Air Unit was overhead advising remaining people to leave the area. Announcements were made continuously while officers provided an opportunity for people to leave the area. At this time, it was determined that the aggressive individuals were positioned to the west of the police line. Officers were deployed and formed a line expanding from 2nd just north of Monroe Street. Also at this time, the crowd was determined to be unlawfully assembled due to their actions and the official unlawful assembly announcement was broadcast via a police public address system from a marked Patrol Tahoe. After the unlawful assembly advisement, grenadiers continued to confront aggressive individuals as the police line marched slowly northward toward Van Buren Street. Upon arrival at
the intersection of Van Buren and 2nd Streets, the intersection was cleared of all people as they
had stopped traffic and blocked the public right of way. The east side police line which had been
held in place and assisted with clearing the area along 3rd and Monroe Streets secured the
Catholic Diocese building. Officers then moved north to Van Buren Street to prevent groups from
compromising the police line to the west. These areas were secured by members of the police
line without having to initiate physical force contact with any individuals.

At approximately 9:10 PM, TRU personnel were deployed to the intersection of Central Avenue
and Van Buren Street to assist with dispersing the last remaining individuals that gathered in that
area. All individuals were dispersed from the area without incident. Once completed, demobilization of police personnel commenced.

During the TRU deployment of active tactics on Monroe Street, additional police personnel were
used for the following:

- Staging was implemented at 333 W. Jefferson Street where non-TRU officers were
deployed and mobilized to support fixed positions around the Convention Center
- Standby officers were used to relieve fixed posts, and secure 2nd Street locations as teams
progressed
- Additional officers cleared and secured the 2nd Street Parking Garage during crowd control
efforts and maintained a high-profile presence in the neighborhoods north of Van Buren
Street during the crowd engagement to limit property damage in the neighborhood and
business area
- Transit personnel remained at the light rail platforms and ensured peaceful transition from
the street to train was maintained

Timeline of Significant Activities & Events

Below is a general timeline of the events that occurred on August 22, 2017, in downtown Phoenix
as a result of the Presidential visit. The items listed here are approximate times and provide a
general description of activities in chronological order.

As listed in the key below, no color represents general information regarding the events. Green
highlights indicate announcements or warnings given by the Phoenix Police Department to stop
throwing items or unlawful assembly announcements. Yellow highlights indicate actions taken by
groups that were aggressive in nature, and in some instances unlawful. Finally, blue highlights
are the actions initiated by the Phoenix Police Department to respond to aggressive and/or illegal
actions.

- No Color: General information
- Green: Announcements/warnings by police
- Yellow: Aggressive action by individuals and groups
- Blue: Actions initiated by police to disperse aggressive individuals and groups
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2:30</td>
<td>Aggressive individuals confront attendees along 2nd Street, south of Monroe Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:31</td>
<td>CRS is called in to mediate disputes and pedestrian fencing established along the east curb of 2nd Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:35</td>
<td>Items were thrown between opposing groups on 2nd Street, south of Monroe Street</td>
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<tr>
<td>2:38</td>
<td>CRS funnels additional personnel to 2nd Street to maintain separation between opposing groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:44</td>
<td>A police bicycle unit is deployed along 2nd Street, south of Monroe Street, to assist with crowd separation</td>
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<tr>
<td>2:57</td>
<td>Officers coordinating water drop-offs on Van Buren, at 2nd and 3rd Streets for individuals and community groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:44</td>
<td>Additional officers were deployed to provide security for attendees and individuals along established lines</td>
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<tr>
<td>4:00</td>
<td>Doors to the event are open at the Convention Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:00-5:00</td>
<td>Continue to coordinate demonstration marchers from various groups into the overflow area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:04</td>
<td>Police contacted four individuals with rifles at 2nd Avenue and Monroe Street to maintain public safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:07</td>
<td>Police removed an individual who was armed with a weapon, attempting to gain access into the Convention Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:21</td>
<td>Police examined a suspicious package and rendered it safe at 3rd &amp; Monroe Streets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:30</td>
<td>Convention Center doors closed due to capacity and safety concerns. At that time, there were approximately 15,000 individuals inside and 4,000 to 5,000 individuals outside the Convention Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:57</td>
<td>Police monitored four armed male subjects reported in the area of the Herberger Theater to maintain public safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:00</td>
<td>Individuals burned an American Flag near the Herberger Theater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:18</td>
<td>Crowd attempted to break through barriers at 3rd Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:20</td>
<td>Police monitored a dozen more armed subjects leaving the Convention Center area</td>
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<tr>
<td>6:22</td>
<td>Police responded to seven male subjects armed with rifles at 5th Street, just north of Van Buren, to maintain public safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:32</td>
<td>The President arrives at the Convention Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:36</td>
<td>Police responded to multiple armed male subjects in downtown area to maintain public safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:39</td>
<td>Police responded to opposing groups fighting at 3rd &amp; Washington Streets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:50</td>
<td>Police separate opposing groups with police tape at 3rd &amp; Washington Streets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:01</td>
<td>Additional units needed to separate crowd at 3rd &amp; Washington Streets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:03</td>
<td>Water bottles being thrown at officers from the crowd at 2nd &amp; Monroe Streets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:13</td>
<td>Additional police units arrive to prevent items from being thrown from 2nd – 3rd on Monroe Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:15</td>
<td>Announcements by police not to throw objects from 2nd – 3rd on Monroe Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:23</td>
<td>All police response will be wearing helmets for protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:28</td>
<td>Announcement by police not to throw items, 5th &amp; Adams Streets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:33</td>
<td>Vehicles being damaged by protesters at 2nd &amp; McKinley Streets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:42</td>
<td>Groups began directing chants towards officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:00-8:25</td>
<td>The LRAD was used to make continuous announcement in an effort to stop individuals from throwing objects between 2nd and 5th, along Monroe Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:15</td>
<td>Water bottles thrown at officers from 2nd &amp; Monroe Street parking garage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:23</td>
<td>ANTIFA used large flags to conceal their activities at 2nd &amp; 3rd Streets, Near the Herberger Theater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:33</td>
<td>President starting to leave the Convention Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:33</td>
<td>Attempted barrier breach by ANTIFA group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:33</td>
<td>Police deployed pepper balls at the ground in front of ANTIFA in an effort to prevent a barrier breach and maintain public safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:33</td>
<td>Police reported being hit by rocks and bottles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:34</td>
<td>Field Force Commander (FFC) gave an order to stop the deployment of pepper balls, to ascertain its effectiveness in deterring unlawful activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:34</td>
<td>Air Unit requested to illuminate the area and make announcements, but delayed because of the need to get FAA clearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:34</td>
<td>CS gas being thrown at the police from the crowd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:34-9:31</td>
<td>Crowd continues to throw and/or kick items at police, to include police deployed munitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:34</td>
<td>Police don gas masks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:35</td>
<td>Police deployed smoke only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:36</td>
<td>Police use pepper balls to drive back aggressive individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:36</td>
<td>Police deployed OC grenades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:36-8:45</td>
<td>Police used pepper balls to drive individuals back so that a police line could be formed in the overflow area in an effort to eventually disperse the aggressive crowd out of the area – this occurred near the Herberger Theater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:40</td>
<td>Air Unit arrives overhead in downtown area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:47</td>
<td>FFC requested the Air Unit make announcements after FAA clearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:52-9:10</td>
<td>Air Unit was used to continually make announcements to disperse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:56</td>
<td>Police line begins marching to move crowd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:56-9:31</td>
<td>Police deployed OC, pepper balls and tactics to disperse crowd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:02</td>
<td>Used Police Tahoe to make unlawful assembly announcements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:14</td>
<td>Grenadiers target anyone who aggressively approaches the police line with pepper balls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:20</td>
<td>Police gave press the announcement to leave area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:31</td>
<td>Police rear guard kept in place while breaking down Field Force Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:47</td>
<td>Used police Tahoe to make unlawful assembly announcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:56</td>
<td>Last Tahoe cleared out and started patrolling streets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:00</td>
<td>All the fixed positions near 3rd &amp; Jefferson Streets were released</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Training**

Tactical Response Unit personnel participate in a two-day training and certification which consists of:

- Introduction to riot and crowd control
- Familiarization of shield capabilities
- Movement drills and practical implementation of techniques in a controlled environment
- Scenario based training
- Exposure to CS gas – and successfully show proficiency in performing tasks
- Additional various tasks in order to be a certified TRU officer

Each officer must show proficiency in these areas, recertify annually, and are then designated as a Level 1 Public Order Officer.

Tactical Response Unit Grenadiers participate in a three-day training and certification which consists of:

- Introduction and familiarization of each non-lethal weapon system
- Advanced crowd control and crowd dispersal techniques
- Each grenadier is required to deploy munitions from these systems to within standards specified by the manufacturer and department deployment policies
- Each grenadier has to successfully maneuver in a CS filled environment and perform basic tasks, including mask manipulation and decontamination

Each Grenadier must show proficiency for each munition, recertify annually, and are then considered a Level 2 Public Order Officer.

The Tactical Response Unit is comprised of personnel from a variety of units and details within the department. Testing and selection procedures are designed to identify mature, experienced, senior officers that will professionally interact with antagonistic and in some instances aggressive individuals and crowds during demonstrations and other related activities.

**Chemical Munitions**

Chemical munitions are best described as less lethal products which are under pressure, pyrotechnic, incendiary, emit projectiles, generate smoke, or are explosive in nature. When used in accordance with training guidelines and the law enforcement agency's policy, they are intended to cause varying degrees of pain and injury, which are temporary. These products are restricted to law enforcement, corrections, and military personnel and are used to gain compliance, disperse crowds, restore order, or temporarily incapacitate dangerous persons. In rare circumstances, less-lethal products may cause damage to property, serious bodily injury, or death. These chemical munitions are not utilized for police day to day operations, but are used specifically for crowd control.

During the event, seven teams of two grenadiers were deployed in the downtown area. The information below, provided by Sergeant Douglas McBride, summarizes the munitions used throughout the incident. Further information is documented in Incident Reports 2017-1478672 (see attachment).
Field Force Commander (FFC):

Lieutenant Benjamin Moore #6803

Grenadier Team Leader (GTL)

Sergeant Douglas McBride #6187

Sergeant Douglas McBride #6187 – Grenadier Team leader – Pepper ball launcher Serial# 1626535, equipped with red dot optic and laser site

At the direction of the Field Force Commander (FFC), the Grenadier Team Leader (GTL) deployed a tube of pepper ball at individuals who were participating in civil unrest and acts of active aggression towards police officers.

Officer Glenn Neville #5774 – Stun Bag shotgun (orange) Serial# B871758M – Throw Bag

At the direction of the FFC, deployed two smoke canisters and one CS canister during the civil unrest.

Officer Robert Scott #6158 – Pepper ball launcher Serial# 1873910, equipped with red dot optic and laser site

At the direction of the GTL, deployed ¾ of a tube of pepper ball at various individuals trying to breach the fence line or who were throwing objects at the police.

Officer Rikki Woolgar #7510 – 40mm launcher Serial# GS0524/Throw Bag

During the course of civil unrest, and at the direction of the FFC, threw three CS canisters and directed three OC muzzle blasts at an aggressive crowd.

Officer James Ray #5835 – Pepper ball launcher Serial# 230002217

At the direction of the FFC, conducted a one-time dispersal of five to seven rounds of pepper ball at the feet of an individual attempting to kick a CS canister back at the skirmish line.

Officer George Herr #7737 – Pepper ball launcher Serial# 230006117

At the direction of the GTL, deployed ¾ of a tube of pepper ball until the launcher malfunctioned. He then obtained a less lethal shotgun and utilized a Bore Thunder round to disperse the individuals who were conducting various acts of active aggression towards officers, to include throwing a wooden flag pole. After seeing the flag pole, he observed a male with a water bottle in his hand and he loaded a stun bag round. As the male reared back to throw it at police he fired one round which impacted the upper torso preventing him from throwing the water bottle. Officer Herr was approximately 45 feet away.
Officer John Sticca #7765 – Less lethal shotgun (orange) Serial# B888121M / Throw Bag

After a small incendiary device thrown from the crowd hit him in the hand while he was standing behind the police line, the FFC had given the order for gas, he threw (2) smoke canisters and (1) CS canister at the crowd. When his partner Officer Herr’s pepper ball launcher went down, Officer Sticca gave him a less lethal shotgun with munitions.

Sergeant Brian Bachorski #7403 - Bravo Team leader – Throw Bag – No Deployment

Officer William Gates #6831 – Pepper ball launcher Serial# 230001917 – No Deployment

Officer Christopher Turiano #6424 – 40mm launcher Serial# GS0525 / Throw Bag

At the direction of the FFC, fired (8) 40mm CTS warning munitions over the heads of the crowd in order to move them back. In addition, he targeted individuals either advancing on the line or trying to kick police munitions back at officers. He had one confirmed hit with a Frangible Impact OC Powder round from a distance of 60 feet which targeted the lower torso. That suspect was later arrested for his actions. During the course of the civil unrest, he fired an additional (8) 40mm Frangible Impact OC powder rounds, (10) 40mm CTS Sponge Spin Stabilized Impact Rounds, (8) 40mm OC muzzle blast, (4) smoke canisters and (3) CS canisters.

Officer Jeffrey Howell #5823 – Pepper ball launcher Serial# 1873912, equipped with red dot optic and laser site

At the direction of the FFC, deployed approximately one tube of pepper ball at various individuals participating in civil unrest.

Officer Lane White #6356 – Less lethal shotgun (orange) Serial# B878329M / Throw Bag

At the direction of the FFC, deployed (3) smoke canisters and (3) CS canisters during the civil unrest.

Officer J.D. Kurtis Merena #7117 – Pepper ball launcher Serial# 230016917 / Throw Bag

At the direction of the FFC, he delivered approximately 1.25 tubes of pepper ball, (4) canisters of smoke and (3) canisters of CS gas.

Officer Brandy Thwing #7686 – Less lethal shotgun Serial# B760509M / Throw Bag – No Deployment

Officer John Stewart #8215 – Less lethal shotgun Serial# AB758554M / Throw Bag

Obtained a Throw Bag from Officer Turiano sometime during the civil unrest. Delivered (1) smoke and (2) CS grenades.
Field Force Extraction Team:

Officer Arnulfo Cuellar #5547 – Stun Bag Shotgun – No Deployment

Officer Lamar Rushing #5641 – Grenadier support – No Deployment

Officer Esteban Navarrette #5948 – Stun Bag Shotgun – No Deployment

Officer Adam Applegate #6847 – Grenadier support – No Deployment

Officer Mathew Tate #7559 – Stun Bag Shotgun – No Deployment
Total Munitions Deployed:

4.75 tubes of pepper ball (approximately 100-110 pepper balls per tube)

Concentrated version of CS/PAVA projectiles for use in high-intensity/MFF/Crowd Control operations. Used for direct impact and area saturation:

- Caliber: .68
- Weight: 3 grams
- Payload: 2.5 gram
- Shelf Life: 3 years
- Velocity: 285-325 FPS
- Kinetic: 12-15 J
- Temperature: -30° to 150°F
- Shell Seam: Ultrasonically welded
- Formula: 1.25% CS 1.25% PAVA

(16) CTS Outdoor Smoke Grenades CS Model 6230
(16) CTS Outdoor Smoke Grenades Model 6210

The 62-Series Grenades are a pyrotechnic grenade discharging smoke and irritant agents through multiple emission ports. The grenade is a military type configuration with the same dimensions weight and performance of M-18 type grenades. CSI manufactures a variety of CTS less lethal products which are under pressure, pyrotechnic, incendiary, emit projectiles, generate smoke, or are explosive in nature. When used in accordance with CTS training guidelines and the individual agency's policy, they are intended to cause varying degrees of pain and injury, which are temporary. These products are restricted to law enforcement, corrections, and military personnel and are used to gain compliance, disperse crowds, restore order, or temporarily incapacitate dangerous persons. In rare circumstances, CTS less-lethal products may cause damage to property, serious bodily injury or death. Therefore, any person using the force option depicted on this page should receive proper training to ensure the safest and most effective use.

(1) ALS 1208 Bore Thunder 12-gauge round

The ALS1208 Bore Thunder is a 12-gauge muzzle bang that produces approximately 174 dB at 5 feet. A low cost, highly effective munition, the 1208 produces a diversionary device effect with flash and overpressure from a 12-gauge platform.

(1) Less-Lethal Super-Sock Bean Bag Round

Cotton Kevlar woven bag filled with 40 grams #9 shot, intended to be a direct fire impact munition.

- Projectile Weight 40 gm
- Cartridge Material Plastic
- Projectile Material Shot filled Ballistic Fiber Reinforced
- flexible sock
- Overall Height 2.40” (61mm)
- Overall Weight 56 gm.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Point Control Impact Munitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caliber</td>
<td>40MM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon Compatibility</td>
<td>All 40MM Launchers, M203, M79 and Multi-Launcher Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartridge Length</td>
<td>3.9” (99.0 mm)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective Range*</td>
<td>50 YD (45 M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projectile Weight</td>
<td>60 gm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projectile Material</td>
<td>Closed Cell Neoprene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Weight</td>
<td>105 gm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Velocity</td>
<td>240-260 ft./sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warranty</td>
<td>5 Years from Shipment Date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Aerial Flash-Bangs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caliber</td>
<td>40MM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon Compatibility</td>
<td>All 40MM Launchers, M203, M79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartridge Length</td>
<td>4.1” (104 mm)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective Range*</td>
<td>100 Meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound Output</td>
<td>165-175 dB Average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Output</td>
<td>6 Million Candela Minimum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terminal Effects</td>
<td>Explosion and Bright Flash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warranty</td>
<td>5 Years from Shipment Date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<td>Weapon Compatibility</td>
<td>All 40MM Launchers, M203, M79 and Multi-Launcher Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartridge Length</td>
<td>4.0” (101.6 mm)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective Range*</td>
<td>50 YD (45 M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projectile Weight</td>
<td>39 gm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projectile Material</td>
<td>Polyurethane Foam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Weight</td>
<td>85 gm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Velocity</td>
<td>290-320 ft./sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warranty</td>
<td>5 Years from Shipment Date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The frangible Impact and munitions are spin-stabilized projectile and deliver a dispersal of irritant powder on and around target. Although it is extremely accurate and consistent, accuracy is dependent on the launcher, using open sights vs. an improved sight, environmental conditions,
and the operator. Effectiveness depends on many variable, such as distance, clothing, stature, and the point where the projectile impacts.

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<td>Projectile Material</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Weight</td>
<td>105 gm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Velocity</td>
<td>240-260 ft./sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warranty</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Model 4557 Sponge Baton is a spin-stabilized projectile. Although it is extremely accurate and consistent, accuracy is dependent on the launcher, using open sights vs. an improved sight, environmental conditions, and the operator. Effectiveness depends on many variable, such as distance, clothing, stature, and the point where the projectile impacts.
Community Relations Bureau

Assigned Duties & Functions

The Community Relations Bureau, Community Response Squads (CRS) have the primary responsibility of maintaining an ongoing, working relationship with the diverse community stakeholders in the City of Phoenix. The squads also facilitate the department’s 12 Phoenix Police Advisory Boards, a forum where the Phoenix Police Department can actively listen to community members concerns and have open dialogue to create solutions to challenges. The squads actively engage community members and form partnerships that create a climate of trust and legitimacy between the Phoenix Police Department and the community.

Summary of Activities

Throughout the week prior to and up to the start of the event, CRS personnel were in communication with a point of contact from the following:

- Barb Lubin - AZ Democratic Party
- Petra Falcon - Promise AZ (PAZ)
- Carlos Garcia - Puente
- Sal Reza, Sylvia Herrera, Rob McElwain, Tupak Huehuecoyotl - Tonatierra & Comites de Defense del Barrio
- Cristian Avila - Mi Familia Vota
- Deedra Abboud - Love Activists: Healing Hearts and Minds
- Zulema Rodriguez - Political Activist and Community Leader
- Jose Patino – AZ Dream Act Coalition
- Tami Updegraff – Director of Herberger Theater Security
- Antonio Velasquez – Maya Chapin
- Jose Guzman – Victims and Relatives of Victims of Crimes
- Lydia Guzman – Chicanos Por La Causa
- Muslim, Refugee & Sikh Advisory Board Chairs
- Carlos Galindo – Elvira - ADL
- Tonya Arroyo – No Hate on Our Streets
- Redeem Robinson, Ken Hienzelman, James Pennington, Jerry Heikens – First Church UCC
- Preacher Dean – Solo Street Preacher

During the days leading up to the event, communication focused on verifying marching routes, sharing information regarding the number of people and planned activity once arriving in the downtown Phoenix area. CRS assisted groups wanting to drop off water at designated locations and explained that the police will protect the right of peaceful assembly but unlawful acts would require a decisive response. On the day of the event, CRS personnel assisted with five planned marches from various locations throughout the city. Each march was completed without interruption of vehicular or pedestrian traffic.

During the event, CRS personnel in plain clothes attire, interacted with community members and group organizers to ensure First Amendment Rights were protected and to diffuse any potential violence between groups. However, based on the size of the crowds, at times this proved to be a difficult task. Numerous groups arrived in downtown Phoenix near the Convention Center.
Additionally, thousands of community members came into downtown from various directions. Once downtown, community members and organizers were dispersed and intermingled into larger groups. CRS personnel were then assigned to monitor the larger groups making it difficult to maintain communication with a point of contact from each organization.

Throughout the day, a CRS Supervisor and five assigned detectives responded to locations around the Convention Center to contact individuals or groups that were creating disturbances. At one point this team was directed to 300 E. Washington Street to assist at that location. There were hundreds of people formed into two large opposing groups arguing and on the verge of a physical altercation. There were individuals being pushed into the curb lane of westbound traffic on Washington Street creating a public safety issue. The CRS supervisor made several requests and phone calls for additional units and TRU personnel. TRU responded and assisted with crowd and traffic control and eventually were able to separate the two groups.

At events where there is the potential for police to engage in enforcement activities, CRS protocol is to warn of possible police action or if any level of force is going to be initiated prior to deployment. As disturbance activity escalated, CRS personnel had difficulty implementing this protocol based on the significant number of people within the downtown area.
Public Affairs Bureau

Assigned Duties & Functions

Phoenix Police Public Information (PIO) Sergeant Mercedes Fortune was assigned to the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), which coordinated efforts with personnel from the Phoenix IMT. Phoenix Sergeants Jonathan Howard and Vince Lewis were assigned to the downtown area to monitor the events and report real time information to the Communications Group at the EOC. Following the event, the Sergeants coordinated with the Mayor, the Police Chief, and the City of Phoenix Communications Director to provide initial information to the media.

Summary of Activities

Following a large demonstration in downtown Phoenix on the day of the event, the Phoenix Police Department Public Affairs Bureau was tasked with reviewing the public communications plan to determine if changes would enhance public safety messaging. Based on citizen feedback following the event, there were some consistent areas that were identified as needing improvement:

- Some people within the crowd reported that they did not hear warnings or orders to leave the area
- Some people within the crowd reported that they were unaware that criminal conduct was occurring in the area
- Some people were unaware that presence at an unlawful assembly is dangerous and unlawful and subjects them to arrest and reasonable force necessary to preserve life and property
- Some people reported that nonverbal indicators such as officers donning gas masks, helmets, and shields were not indicators that the threat level was increasing and continued criminal conduct by some in the crowd might lead to enforcement action

The PIO’s review determined messaging can be enhanced internally among public safety personnel, and externally by utilizing social media to provide real time information to community members and media outlets.
**Professional Standards Bureau**

**Assigned Duties and Functions**

The Professional Standards Bureau (PSB) is comprised of the Administrative, Investigations, and Inspections Units. Each unit contributed significant resources regarding the review and documentation of law enforcement activities and the dissemination of information associated with the event.

The PSB Administrative Unit is staffed by a Police Commander, along with sworn and non-sworn personnel. The unit is responsible for supporting operations by providing electronic tracking of all bureau activities and disseminating PSB records to various public and government entities.

The PSB Inspections Unit consists of a Lieutenant, five Sergeants, four Detectives and a non-sworn Research Analyst. Inspections is responsible for conducting evaluations of all police activities to appraise the utility of existing policies, procedures, and programs. In addition, the unit conducts compliance inspections and internal performance audits to establish the effectiveness of current operational controls and/or programs.

The Investigations Unit is staffed by three Lieutenants and fifteen Sergeants. The unit is responsible for investigating a variety of administrative issues including: alleged misconduct and service complaints against department employees, officer-involved shootings, in-custody deaths, and serious incidents involving a pursuit or police equipment collision.

**Summary of Activities**

The PSB Administrative and Inspections Unit personnel assisted the Police Code Enforcement Unit with the collection and redaction of information pertaining to several public records requests associated with the event. Inspections was also tasked with providing staff to the IMT Finance section and completing the Phoenix Public Safety After-Action Report. Investigations personnel gathered commendations and investigated all citizen complaints related to the event.

Administrative and Inspections staff gathered, reviewed, and released several hours of recorded video from body worn cameras and the police Air Unit for public records requests. Video was also reviewed to determine if police conduct was appropriate and in compliance with department policy. No misconduct was found.

Investigations personnel documented 81 commendations, 10 citizen complaints, and one Administrative Inquiry documented in the PSB electronic tracking system related to the event (see details below). The commendations primarily expressed support for the police officers regarding the professionalism and restraint utilized in dealing with opposing groups and unlawful activities. Although some community members primarily expressed dissatisfaction with police actions, no misconduct was found. The following is a synopsis of the 10 citizen complaints:

- Seven of the complaints were citizens expressing their dissatisfaction with the overall handling of unlawful activities, primarily focusing on not receiving or being able to hear an appropriate warning prior to the deployment of crowd dispersing non-lethal use of force tactics
Three complaints focused on either being struck with a non-lethal projectile or exposure to a chemical munition, these incidents were found to be in compliance with policy.

One Administrative Inquiry (INQ17-0885) reference failure to obey a direct order by a supervisor and providing untruthful statements was unfounded.

All citizen commentary received, positive or negative, have been and will continue to be thoroughly examined for any training opportunities that may improve police procedures in regard to preparing, responding, and ensuring public and officer safety for future events.

Community and Police Trust Initiative

A series of 13 listening sessions had already been scheduled by Phoenix Police Chief Jeri Williams to provide a platform for public commentary. As part of the Community and Police Trust Initiative (CPTI), the Community Listening Sessions were advertised and open to the public. Additionally, the sessions served to promote transparency, legitimacy and to present Chief Williams' vision, values, and goals for the Phoenix Police Department. These sessions were scheduled between Tuesday, September 6, 2017, and Thursday, September 28, 2017, at various times and locations to accommodate as many citizens as possible. Each CPTI Community Listening Session was attended by Chief Williams (or another member of the executive staff delegated to represent her) as well as Director Marchelle Franklin, Community Affairs Division, Phoenix Police Department. Many other ranking and front-line city and police employees were also in attendance.

After a brief presentation by Chief Williams, attending members of the community were presented with the opportunity to address the Chief and speak on any matter of their choosing. Questions and concerns were immediately addressed by the Chief and her team. In the event a concern could not be immediately resolved, the presenting member of the community was directed to available personnel and resources. In each case, the individual’s name and contact information was recorded and assigned to a member of the Chief’s staff for follow-up. Notes from each citizen’s presentation were recorded (copies of notes from each session can be provided).

During the listening sessions, a broad range of concerns were presented before the Chief. On several occasions, these concerns were related to the Presidential visit. The commentary related to the event were both critical and commendatory with respect to the actions and response of the police department. The complimentary reports commended the Chief and the Phoenix Police Department for their discipline, professionalism, and dedication to duty. Those expressing concern and criticism echoed those reports made to the Professional Standards Bureau Investigations personnel, citing excessive force, insufficient warning prior to the deploying of chemical munitions, and targeting those assembled peacefully.

In addition to the CPTI Community Listening Sessions, the staff of St. Mary’s Basilica, located at 231 North 3rd Street which is in the downtown Phoenix area, requested an opportunity to have their concerns heard. Members of the Professional Standards Bureau responded in person on Friday, September 1, 2017, to meet with the staff. The Basilica’s primary concern was a lack of communication and warning from the city and police department prior to the President’s visit. They stated in the past, members of the police department typically met with and discussed upcoming events that might affect the staff, some of which are full-time residents of the facility. One unintended consequence was the movement of the airborne chemical munitions that permeated the grounds of the Basilica. In response to the complaint by Basilica personnel, members of the police executive team met with the Basilica staff to ensure more effective and open communication.
Phoenix Police Employee Assistance Unit

Assigned Duties & Functions

The Phoenix Police Department Employee Assistance Unit (EAU) is comprised of four detectives, one sergeant and one lieutenant. There are two detectives on call 24 hours a day, seven days a week and the EAU phone line is transferred to the primary detective on call after normal business hours. EAU detectives regularly get phone calls from employees for themselves or their families reference a variety of topics including but not limited to: medical insurance and coverage, retiree deaths, funeral preparation, industrial injuries, long-term disability, medical retirements, and divorce. EAU personnel are not counselors or psychologists, but they are listeners who connect employees with resources to meet their immediate needs. The Employee Assistance Program (EAP) offers employees and their families twelve visits with a mental health professional per issue, with three of the visits allowed while on duty.

Another resource available to employees from home or at work is a website created and maintained by the 100 Club, bulletproof.org. Bulletproof is a confidential and anonymous resource that provides law enforcement professionals and their families with mental health and wellness initiatives, addiction awareness tools, assessments, and direction towards treatment and care. The bulletproof website can be accessed from any computer or smartphone and can be accessed by the employee or their families at any time.

The department also has a Police Chaplain Program and currently there are three chaplains available 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The main purpose of the Police Chaplain Program is to serve the employees of the department and intercede relative to ministerial concerns.

Summary of Activities

During the event, the Employee Assistance Unit personnel were available during business hours and on-call to respond in the evening hours if needed. The Employee Assistance Unit did not receive any contact from department employees via email, telephone, or in person, reference the Presidential visit during or after the event.
Phoenix Fire Department

Assigned Duties & Functions

Phoenix Fire personnel established a special event incident number and utilized the “Geo Fence” system to determine boarders for dispatching units. This was implemented in the early afternoon hours (approximately 2:00 PM) on August 22, 2017. Geographical boarders used to track emergency medical calls related to the event were 7th Avenue to 7th Street (east and west) and Van Buren to Madison Streets (north and south).

Summary of Activities

Fire department personnel responded to 53 emergency medical calls in which 11 patients were transported to local hospitals for various reasons. The breakdown of calls is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Call Type</th>
<th>Numbers of Calls</th>
<th>Number of Transports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ill Person/Heat</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>8 (1 officer transported)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alert Level of Consciousness</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulty Breathing</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unconsciousness Person</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injured Person</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown Medical</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person Down</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diabetic Problem</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional information related to emergency medical calls:

- The majority of the calls were related to heat exposure, temperatures reached a high of 106 degrees in the late afternoon hours
  - Two pallets (156 cases at 24 bottles per case) totaling 1,872 bottles of water were distributed to people in the downtown area by public safety personnel in an effort to prevent heat related illness
- Difficulty breathing calls
  - One was possibly related to the extreme heat
  - Two were patient refusals and were both at approximately 6:00 PM
  - One officer was treated after the deployment of chemical munitions at 8:00 PM
- There were 10 calls dispatched from approximately 8:00 PM – 10:45 PM. They were related to:
  - Three officers treated for extreme heat conditions
  - One officer was treated for difficulty breathing
  - One officer was treated for illness
  - Five to six news reporters treated for “tear gas” exposure, none were transported
  - One person treated for a laceration to the face, police and fire responded; individual not transported
  - Two people were treated for illness, not transported
Opportunities for Improvement

**Homeland Defense Bureau**

The Incident Management Team (IMT) began operations on the day of the event. For future events, ensure the IMT is operational at least one day prior to verify all personnel have information needed to complete assigned tasks.

There was a shortage of seating and electrical outlets for the Strategic Partners in the Emergency Operations center (EOC), due to a large turnout of partners for this event. Ensure additional space and resources are considered for future events.

Some Tactical Response Unit (TRU) Officers required gas mask repairs or replacements during the engagement. Ensure TRU personnel inspect, repair, or replace equipment and verify proper working condition prior to the start of an event.

One police supervisor developed and coordinated motorcade and downtown traffic plans which was a daunting task. Ensure appropriate supervisory staff is considered and utilized for planning all aspects of future large-scale events.

Large opposing groups were gathered in the downtown area, and activities were monitored by plain clothes officers. Ensure sufficient plain clothes personnel are utilized for future events.

**Tactical Response Unit**

Ensure a proactive notification process is utilized when communicating with groups believed to be intent on causing public disorder.

Ensure TRU grenadiers develop and implement a munitions accountability process. The process should require the signing out of all munitions before deployment and a munitions count by a supervisor at the conclusion of an event.

Ensure TRU supervisors review all police reports and use of force documentation generated by grenadiers following deployment.

Establish a protocol to account for munitions deployed prior to the incident, and if possible regarding the type of munitions allowable and identify circumstances they may be deployed.

**Community Relations Bureau**

Identified areas for opposing groups to conduct activities can quickly change based on the size of crowds. Planning of future events should ensure additional resources are available to react to sudden changes in movement by crowds to avert possible public safety issues.

As disturbance activity began to rapidly develop, Tactical Response Units (TRU) had limited time to make announcements before engaging the crowd. This also provided little to no time for CRS personnel to inform the crowd as to the impending actions of TRU Officers. TRU personnel made announcements that the assembly was unlawful and groups would have to disperse. However, additional police personnel were needed to effectively inform the crowd of TRU engagement activities. TRU personnel should ensure that CRS personnel are notified as quickly as possible.
of engagement plans so both TRU and CRS can assist with immediate notifications to gathered crowds and provide a greater opportunity to disperse.

**Public Affairs Bureau**

Use social media (Twitter, Instagram, etc.) to communicate, when practical, real-time observations from the scene. Ensure information pertaining to safety tips and recommendations that support free speech activities and discourage disruptive behaviors that threaten lawful activities is communicated.

Ensure scene Incident Commanders and officers utilize amplified notifications in conjunction with police action. Handheld megaphones or similar low-tech options are preferable to voice or no warnings for clear dispersal directions.

Use social media to notify the public each time warnings are given including the location and intended message. Amplified warnings should be given in all but the most extreme incidents before enforcement or dispersal actions are taken against the larger assembly.

Ensure Community Response Squad (CRS) personnel have updated information to text or otherwise notify event coordinators of event status, so they can share current information with attendees. This would also include encouraging people to distance themselves from criminal conduct and report unlawful behaviors.

Ensure warnings and amplified messages are provided in both English and Spanish and consideration should be given to following a specific pre-approved script or be pre-recorded.

Ensure scene interviews are conducted by appropriate city and department personnel with media officials during the event to update status and observations.

**Police Chief**

Ensure that during initial press briefings, state what is currently known and what is subject to change after appropriate review.

Ensure a follow-up strategy is developed to address media and public inquiries the day following any significant incident or event.

Ensure an After-Action Report is prepared to document any significant incident or event.